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A
s the monetary aggregates have become
less reliable guides for monetary policy,
considerable interest has developed in iden-
tifying some other fundamental guide for policy.
Many analysts argue that the best guide might be
nominal gross domestic product (GDP). Some of
these analysts also argue the Federal Reserve should
target nominal GDP using one of several possible
rules. Such a rule would specify how the Federal
Reserve should adjust policy to affect a short-term
interest rate in response to deviations of nominal
GDP from target.
This article examines the performance of nomi-
nal GDP targeting rules using statistical simulations
of the economy. The first section reviews the argu-
ment that policymakers should target nominal GDP
using a rule. The second section describes some
alternative targeting rules. The third section shows
how these rules would perform based on simulation
analysis of models of the U.S. economy. The article
concludes that policymakers cannot be certain that
a simple nominal GDP targeting rule would improve
economic performance.
THE ARGUMENT FOR A NOMINAL GDP
TARGETING RULE
Since the mid-1970s, the Federal Reserve has
established target ranges for the monetary aggre-
gates and has monitored growth in the aggregates
relative to the targets. But in recent years, financial
market innovation and deregulation have made the
aggregates much less reliable policy guides. Many
believe the reduced reliability of the aggregates
has created a need for some other fundamental guide
for policy. Some analysts also argue that nominal
GDP should replace the monetary aggregates as a
guide for monetary policy and that following a simple
rule for targeting nominal GDP would help stabilize
the economy.
The need for an alternative target variable
Targets for variables like the monetary aggre-
gates or nominal GDP, it is maintained, might help
policymakers balance the policy goals of sustainable
economic growth and price stability. With a good
target variable, holding the variable on target should
help stabilize real GDP in the short term and also
yield inflation consistent with the long-term objec-
tive of price stability.
1
For a number of years, the Federal Reserve
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of Kansas City.relied on targets for the monetary aggregates. The
targets helped stabilize real GDP in the short term.
For example, sluggish money growth was seen to
signal a slowdown in real GDP growth. As a result,
easing monetary policy when money growth fell
below target helped moderate declines in real GDP
growth. The targets for the monetary aggregates
were also expected to help policymakers achieve
long-term inflation objectives. Throughout most of
the 1980s, for example, the Federal Reserve gradu-
ally lowered the money growth targets to guide its
efforts to gradually reduce inflation.
In recent years, however, the monetary aggre-
gates have become unreliable guides. For example,
given the historical relationship between M2 growth
and economic activity, the sluggish behavior of M2
in 1992 and 1993 would have been consistent with
an economy in recession (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System). Instead, the economy
grew an average of 3.3 percent per year as measured
by real GDP. To many analysts, such false signals
create a need for some other fundamental guide for
policy.
The potential benefits of nominal GDP
targeting
Nominal GDP may be a useful guide for policy
because it is closely related to real GDP growth and
inflation. By definition, nominal GDP equals the
product of real GDP and the price level. Similarly,
the growth of nominal GDP equals the sum of real
GDP growth and inflation.
Over short periods, changes in nominal GDP
growth give rise to similar changes in real GDP
growth with little or no impact on inflation.
2 For
example, nominal GDP growth slowed from 8.7
percent in the first quarter of 1990 to 2.8 percent in
the first quarter of 1991. Mirroring the drop in
nominal GDP growth, real GDP slowed from a 3.4
percent rate of growth to a 2.1 percent rate of decline.
Inflation fell only slightly, from 5.1 percent to 4.8
percent.
3
Over long periods, in contrast, changes in nomi-
nal GDP growth are closely linked to inflation with
no impact on real GDP. Because in the long run real
GDP grows at a fairly constant trend, long-run infla-
tion will tend to equal nominal GDP growth minus
the trend growth of real GDP. For example, if real
GDP grows at a trend rate of 2 1/2 percent, the
Federal Reserve could achieve a long-run inflation
goal of 1 percent by maintaining nominal GDP
growth at 3 1/2 percent.
In addition to its link to policy goals, nominal
GDP has two other features that would, in principle,
make it a good guide for policy.
4 First, under nominal
GDP targeting, monetary policy would adjust to
offset disturbances to aggregate demand. In the short
run, an adverse aggregate demand disturbance, such
as a drop in exports stemming from a recession in
the economy of an important foreign trading partner,
tends to slow real GDP growth and, accordingly,
nominal GDP growth. In response to the reduction
of nominal GDP growth below the targeted rate,
policymakers would ease monetary policy to return
nominal GDP growth to target. This policy change
would stimulate aggregate demand, returning both
demand and real GDP growth to predisturbance
levels.
A second attractive feature of nominal GDP
targeting is that it would help policymakers balance
the goals of stable growth and inflation in respond-
ing to aggregate supply disturbances. In the short
run, an adverse supply disturbance, such as a jump in
oil prices, produces two undesirable consequences—
falling real GDP growth and rising inflation. These
consequences pose a dilemma. Changing monetary
policy to stabilize one variable creates additional
volatility in the other variable. For example, easing
policy to stimulate an economy slowed by a spike in
oil prices would limit the decline in real GDP growth
but would exacerbate inflation. Conversely, tighten-
ing policy to stabilize inflation would exacerbate the
decline in real GDP.
Nominal GDP targeting would help policymak-
ers resolve the dilemma by placing equal emphasis
on stability of both real GDP growth and inflation.
12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYMonetary policy would be adjusted to equalize the
output and inflation effects of an aggregate supply
disturbance. For example, an oil price hike that
caused real GDP growth to fall by 1 percent and
inflation to rise by 0.5 percent would reduce nominal
GDP growth by 0.5 percent. Under nominal GDP
targeting, monetary policy would respond by stimu-
lating the economy enough to raise nominal GDP
growth by 0.5 percent, thus returning nominal GDP
growth to its targeted rate. As a result of this policy
response, real GDP growth would fall and inflation
would rise by the same amount, say 0.75 percent.
5
Thus, nominal GDP targeting would balance the
consequences of the supply disturbance.
The potential benefits of a rule
In implementing nominal GDP targeting, poli-
cymakers might adopt any of a variety of targeting
procedures. Target ranges for nominal GDP growth
might be used in the same way that target ranges for
the monetary aggregates have been used in the past.
Under such a procedure, policymakers would moni-
tor the actual rate of nominal GDP growth relative
to target. They would then use this information,
along with other indicators, to make discretionary
adjustments to policy. Alternatively, policymakers
might adopt more formal procedures for targeting
nominal GDP. For example, policymakers could use
a simple rule, rather than discretion, in adjusting
policy.
6
Rule-based and discretion-based monetary pol-
icy differ fundamentally in that a rule dictates sys-
tematic monetary policy action, while discretion
does not. A rule would specify when and by how
much the Federal Reserve would adjust policy in
response to deviations from target of a variable like
nominal GDP. A rule ensures systematic action:
under a rule, policymakers would adjust policy the
same way this year in response to a deviation from
target as they would two years from now. In contrast,
discretion-based policy permits policymakers to
make policy adjustments on a case-by-case basis.
Some analysts argue rule-based policy is supe-
rior because it will produce lower inflation than
discretionary policy. Suppose, for example, policy-
makers announce a target for nominal GDP growth
of 3.5 percent under the assumption that such a rate
is consistent with a long-term inflation objective of
1 percent and an expected long-term real GDP
growth rate of 2.5 percent. The systematic policy
adjustments dictated by a nominal GDP targeting
rule would be expected to yield nominal GDP
growth of 3.5 percent over long periods. As long as
real GDP grows at the expected trend rate of 2.5
percent, inflation would remain at 1 percent.
In contrast, the nonsystematic policy adjust-
ments permitted by discretionary policy could result
in an average nominal GDP growth rate that exceeds
the target rate. Consequently, discretionary policy
might yield higher inflation than desired. Discretion-
ary policy may suffer an inflationary bias because it
gives policymakers the option to depart occasionally
from announced targets.
7 For example, policymak-
ers may decide to boost nominal GDP growth above
target when an aggregate supply disturbance reduces
growth or causes a recession. Such discretionary
shifts to easier policy might not only push nominal
GDP growth above target but, if maintained, might
also result in higher inflation.
SOME SIMPLE NOMINAL GDP
TARGETING PROCEDURES
Advocates of rules for targeting nominal GDP
have proposed a number of specific rules. Typically,
these rules call for adjusting a short-term interest
rate, such as the federal funds rate, to keep nominal
GDP on target.
8 While policymakers have no direct
control over nominal GDP, they do have great influ-
ence over short-term interest rates. Through open
market operations, for example, policymakers can
increase the degree of pressure on reserve positions,
thereby causing the federal funds rate to rise. 
The proposed rules for targeting nominal GDP
differ, in part, as to when policymakers would react
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dictates that monetary policy would change when
actual nominal GDP is observed to deviate from
target. Another rule dictates that policy would
change when projected future nominal GDP devi-
ates from target. This section examines these two
rules for targeting nominal GDP—a lagged adjust-
ment rule and a forecast adjustment rule.
9
Lagged adjustment. Under the lagged adjust-
ment rule, policymakers would adjust a short-term
interest rate, such as the federal funds rate, after
observing a deviation of nominal GDP growth from
target. Policymakers would raise the funds rate if
nominal GDP growth last quarter exceeded the tar-
geted growth rate. Conversely, policymakers would
lower the funds rate if nominal GDP growth last
quarter was below the targeted rate. The rule stipu-
lates that policymakers adjust the current interest
rate systematically by x percent whenever last quar-
ter’s nominal GDP growth rate (annualized) devi-
ated from target by one percentage point.
10
Advocates of this rule have set the adjustment
parameter x at a variety of values. Most recently,
Judd and Motley (1993) suggested a value of 0.20.
At this level, whenever nominal GDP growth (an-
nualized) exceeds target by one percentage point,
policymakers would raise the short-term interest rate
by 0.20 percent, or 20 basis points. In a previous
study, Judd and Motley (1992) advocated a lower
adjustment rate x of 0.125. At this level, for every
one-percentage-point gap between actual and target
GDP growth (annualized), policymakers would ad-
just the interest rate by 0.125 percent, or 12.5 basis
points.
11
Because the lagged adjustment rule calls for
adjusting an interest rate only after nominal GDP
deviates from target, it may result in unnecessarily
protracted deviations of nominal GDP from target.
These deviations would occur because the rule ig-
nores delays in the effects on nominal GDP of
changes in monetary policy.
12 From the time policy-
makers adjust a short-term interest rate, two to three
quarters may pass before nominal GDP responds.
Many firms, for example, commit well in advance
to plans for spending on plants and equipment.
While a change in the interest rate might quickly
affect plans for future spending, a number of months
could pass before any change in plans affects actual
spending.
Forecast adjustment. An alternative rule which
accounts for the delays in the effects of monetary
policy may better stabilize nominal GDP growth at
the targeted rate. Under this alternative forecast adjust-
ment rule, policymakers look forward, recognizing that
an adjustment in current monetary policy probably
will not affect nominal GDP until two to three
quarters in the future. Using forecasts of future
nominal GDP growth, this alternative rule adjusts
current monetary policy to try to offset expected future
deviations of nominal GDP from target.
Under the forecast adjustment rule, policymakers
would adjust a current short-term interest rate until
forecasted future growth in nominal GDP equals the
targeted rate. If, at the current interest rate level,
forecasts indicate nominal growth next year will
exceed the targeted rate, policymakers would raise
the short-term interest rate. The increase in the inter-
est rate would be expected to slow future growth in
nominal GDP and, as a result, reduce forecasted
nominal GDP growth. Policymakers would raise the
interest rate enough that, based on the higher rate,
the forecast for future growth of nominal GDP
equals the targeted rate.
13 Conversely, if forecasts
indicate nominal GDP growth next year will be
below target, policymakers would reduce the short-
term interest rate enough to raise forecasts to target.
Advocates of the rule have proposed a variety
of forecast procedures. Some suggest the Federal
Reserve use its own forecasts for nominal GDP
growth in setting policy. These forecasts might be
the consensus of Federal Open Market Committee
members or the view of the staff of the Board of
Governors.
14 In this version of the forecast adjustment
rule, policymakers would rely on their own projec-
tion for the next year in adjusting a current interest
rate to keep projected nominal GDP growth on target.
In contrast, Hall and Mankiw (1993) suggest the Fed-
eral Reserve use a consensus prediction of private
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setting policy.
15 In this version of the rule, policy-
makers would adjust a current interest rate until the
consensus private forecast for next year equals the
targeted nominal GDP growth rate.
Both rules have merits. In principle, the forecast
rule would prove superior to the lagged adjustment
rule at stabilizing nominal GDP growth. The forecast
rule adjusts policy now to prevent predicted future
deviations of nominal GDP from target. For exam-
ple, suppose current forecasts indicate U.S. exports
will decline next year and, as a result, the projected
growth of next year’s nominal GDP is below the
targeted rate. The forecast adjustment rule dictates
that policymakers reduce a short-term interest rate
now, by enough to spur next year’s nominal GDP
growth rate to exactly offset the predicted effect of
the fall in exports. In contrast, the lagged adjustment
rule would adjust monetary policy only after nomi-
nal GDP actually deviates from target. Given this
delayed reaction of policy and the lagged effects of
policy changes, several quarters may pass before
monetary policy succeeds at spurring nominal GDP
back toward target.
In practice, however, forecasters make errors in
predicting future movements in nominal GDP. If
forecast errors are large and frequent, the lagged
adjustment rule may better stabilize nominal GDP.
A simple example illustrates how, in practice, the
lagged adjustment rule might prove superior. Sup-
pose forecasts call for next year’s nominal GDP
growth rate to fall 1 percent below target due to a
sharp deterioration in exports. Under the forecast
rule, policymakers would reduce the current interest
rate to spur next year’s nominal GDP growth rate
enough to offset this disturbance. If, however, fore-
casters proved to be wrong and the projected dete-
rioration in exports failed to occur, the change in
monetary policy would push nominal GDP growth
above the targeted rate. Due to the forecast error, the
forecast adjustment rule would create a deviation of
nominal GDP from target.
Because analysts disagree about the magnitude
of forecast errors, they disagree about which rule
would better stabilize nominal GDP. Some analysts
argue forecasts are sufficiently accurate that the
forecast rule would better stabilize nominal GDP.
Hall and Mankiw (1993), for example, show fore-
casts have “substantial” predictive power for actual
nominal GDP growth and conclude the forecast rule
“makes sense.”  Others argue forecast errors are so
large that the lagged adjustment rule would better
stabilize nominal GDP. Meltzer (1987), for example,
shows forecast errors are large enough to prevent
forecasters from distinguishing between recession
and boom. He concludes “policies based on fore-
casts are unlikely to stabilize the economy” and
suggests a lagged adjustment rule.
SIMULATION EVIDENCE
While there is reason to believe simple nominal
GDP targeting rules might be good policy-setting
procedures, policymakers have no experience with
such rules. As a result, direct evidence on their
performance is not available. Instead, statistical
simulations can provide indirect evidence on how
well the proposed rules for targeting nominal GDP
might perform.
The statistical simulations presented here mea-
sure the performance of the economy under each of
the two policy rules.
16 As detailed in the appendix,
the simulations use the policy rules to create coun-
terfactual data on real GDP growth and inflation.
The data are counterfactual because they are gener-
ated from a model in which monetary policy is
guided by one of the nominal GDP targeting rules.
The performance of each rule is gauged by
comparing volatility in counterfactual, rule-guided
data to volatility in historical data.
17 If, for example,
real GDP growth and inflation volatility prove to be
lower in the counterfactual data than in historical
data, the simulations will provide indirect evidence
that the rules would be good policies.
This section presents simulations of the fore-
cast adjustment and lagged adjustment rules for
targeting nominal GDP. The simulations yield two
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results contradict the results of earlier studies. Sec-
ond, some of the simulation results differ sharply
from most analysts’ and policymakers’ prior expecta-
tions about successful policies. These findings suggest
simulation analysis cannot definitively determine
whether the simple nominal GDP targeting rules will
improve economic performance.
The models
To ensure that the simulation results do not
depend on the specific model of the economy used
in the analysis, simulations are conducted with two
different models. The first model, detailed in the
appendix, imposes little structure on the economy
and may be viewed as an atheoretical model. It
relates current values of real GDP growth, inflation,
M2 growth, and a short-term nominal interest rate to
previous values. This model is similar to atheoretical
models used in other studies (such as Judd and Motley
1992, 1993). It differs from some atheoretical models
in two minor respects. The atheoretical model used
here features the level of the interest rate rather than
the change in the interest rate.
18 And, the model
imposes no restrictions on the relationships between
the current values of each variable in the model and
previous values, whereas some other studies impose
restrictions by eliminating particular variables from
certain equations of the model.
The second model, also detailed in the appendix,
assumes a textbook aggregate supply/aggregate de-
mand structure to the economy.
19 The aggregate
supply equation, a Phillips curve, relates inflation
to expected inflation and the gap between actual
and potential real GDP. The aggregate demand
equation relates real GDP growth to a short-term
real interest rate. This structural model is also simi-
lar to models used in other studies. It differs slightly
from some other models, however, in that monetary
policy affects aggregate demand directly rather than
indirectly.
20 In the structural model used in this arti-
cle, policy adjustments to the interest rate affect real
GDP growth directly. In other studies (Judd and
Motley 1992, 1993), policy adjustments to the inter-
est rate affect real GDP growth indirectly through
their influence on money growth.
Evidence on the forecast adjustment rule
Statistical simulations are first used to evaluate
the forecast adjustment rule. As detailed in the appen-
dix, the forecast rule examined in these simulations
relies on forecasts of nominal GDP from an equation
that relates nominal GDP growth to lagged values of
nominal GDP growth and a short-term interest rate.
The specification of the equation is derived from
historical estimates of the relationship between nomi-
nal GDP growth and lagged values of nominal GDP
growth and the interest rate.
Simulations using the forecast adjustment rule
indicate the rule will significantly stabilize both real
GDP growth and inflation (Table 1). The atheoretical
model simulations show that using the forecast ad-
justment rule to keep nominal GDP growth on target
can be expected to reduce volatility in both real GDP
growth and inflation by about 8.5 percent relative to
historical levels. Simulations of the structural model
indicate the forecast adjustment rule will yield
smaller but still sizable benefits. According to these
simulations, both real GDP growth and inflation vari-
ability will fall about 5 percent. Thus, at least on the
surface, the forecast adjustment rule appears to hold
promise for the conduct of monetary policy.
Evidence on the lagged adjustment rule
As was the case with the forecast adjustment
rule, statistical simulations of both the atheoretical
and structural models are used to evaluate the lagged
adjustment rule. Following the recent work of Judd
and Motley (1993), the version of the lagged adjust-
ment rule first examined in these simulations sets the
adjustment parameter x at 0.20. At this level, policy-
makers adjust a short-term interest rate 20 basis
16 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYpoints for every one-percentage-point gap between
actual and targeted nominal GDP growth.
Simulations with this version of the lagged ad-
justment rule suggest the rule will fail to stabilize the
economy (Table 2, column 1). The policy rule will
raise the volatility of both real GDP growth and
inflation substantially above historical levels. The
atheoretical model simulations indicate that, under
the rule, real GDP growth volatility will soar 13.7
percent above the historical level. And, inflation
variability will rise 3.2 percent. The structural model
simulations indicate comparably adverse conse-
quences of lagged adjustment. The volatility of real
GDP growth will rise 6.4 percent above the historical
level, and the volatility of inflation will rise 13.9
percent.
While the lagged adjustment rule fails when the
adjustment parameter x is set at 0.20, the rule may
well succeed at stabilizing the economy when x
takes on different values. The rule may, for exam-
ple, succeed when the adjustment parameter x
equals the value of 0.125 first advocated by Judd
and Motley (1992). At this level, policymakers
change a short-term interest rate 12.5 basis points for
every one-percentage-point difference between ac-
tual and targeted nominal GDP growth.
Simulations using this version of the lagged
adjustment rule indicate the rule might succeed at
stabilizing the economy (Table 2, column 2). The
atheoretical model simulations indicate this version
of the rule will reduce volatility in real GDP growth
by 2.9 percent and volatility in inflation by 5.5
percent. In contrast, simulations under the structural
model indicate this specification of the lagged ad-
justment rule will perform slightly worse than his-
torical policy. According to the structural model
simulations, the rule will raise real GDP variability
by 0.6 percent and inflation variability by 4.0 per-
cent. Together, the favorable atheoretical model re-
sults and the unfavorable structural model results
suggest at least the possibility that this version of the
rule might stabilize the economy.
These simulations show clearly that the lagged
adjustment rule performs better when the adjust-
ment parameter x is set at the lower value of 0.125
rather than 0.20. According to the atheoretical model
Table 1
Economic Performance Under the Forecast Adjustment Rule 
Percentage Reduction in Volatility
Atheoretical model
Real GDP growth  8.6
Inflation 8.4
Structural model
Real GDP growth 4.9
Inflation 5.5
Note: Positive entries indicate reductions in volatility relative to historical volatility. 
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GDP growth falls 2.9 percent from the historical
level when the adjustment parameter is set at
0.125, but rises 13.7 percent when the parameter
is set at 0.20.
The improvement in the performance of the
lagged adjustment rule associated with the reduction
of the adjustment parameter suggests the rule may
perform even better if the adjustment rate is reduced
further. Additional simulations confirm this specu-
lation. Simulations using versions of the lagged
adjustment rule that set the adjustment parameter x
at a number of different values indicate the rule best
stabilizes the economy when x is reduced all the way
to zero. At this level, policymakers do not adjust the
interest rate at all when nominal GDP growth devi-
ates from target. They instead maintain a constant
interest rate.
Under the constant interest rate policy, the vola-
tility of real GDP growth and inflation is greatly
reduced (Table 2, column 3).
21 The atheoretical
model simulations indicate the constant-rate policy
will reduce variability in both real GDP growth and
inflation by about 12 percent relative to historical
policy. The structural model simulations show the
constant-rate policy will reduce real GDP growth
volatility by 4.5 percent and inflation variability by
about 13 percent. These reductions in volatility are
even greater than those achieved under the forecast
adjustment rule.
Lessons from the simulation evidence
On the surface, the simulation results suggest a
simple rule for targeting nominal GDP might per-
form well, stabilizing both real GDP growth and
inflation. For example, evidence suggests the fore-
Table 2
Economic Performance Under the Lagged Adjustment Rule 












Real GDP growth -13.7 2.9 12.1
Inflation  -3.2 5.5 12.0
Structural model
Real GDP growth   -6.4   -.6   4.5
Inflation -13.9 -4.0 13.3
Note: Positive entries indicate reductions in volatility relative to historical volatility. Conversely, negative entries 
indicate increases in volatility.
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GDP growth and inflation and that, with a suffi-
ciently low adjustment parameter, the lagged adjust-
ment rule would also reduce volatility. Considered
carefully, however, the simulation results are not
convincing. Some of the simulation results differ
sharply from those of previous studies. Moreover,
other simulation results run strongly contrary to
most analysts’ and policymakers’ expectations.
These findings suggest simulation analysis does not
provide convincing evidence for a nominal GDP
targeting rule.
Differences from previous studies. The forecast
adjustment rule results contradict those of Hall and
Mankiw (1993). This article finds the forecast ad-
justment rule succeeds at reducing volatility in real
GDP growth and inflation. In contrast, Hall and
Mankiw (1993) concluded the forecast adjustment
rule fails.
22 In their analysis the rule produces more
volatility than historical policy has produced, espe-
cially in real GDP growth.
23
In addition, the results for the version of the
lagged adjustment rule that sets the adjustment pa-
rameter x at 0.20 differ from the results of Judd and
Motley (1993). This article finds that when the
parameter  x equals 0.20, the lagged adjustment rule
fails. The rule raises real GDP growth and inflation
volatility significantly above historical levels. In
contrast, Judd and Motley (1993) concluded the
policy succeeds. In their analysis the rule reduces
inflation volatility, while leaving real GDP growth
volatility near the historical level. Since the models
used by Judd and Motley differ only slightly from
those used in this article, these differences in results
suggest conclusions about rules drawn from simula-
tion evidence are very sensitive to slight differences
in models.
24
A difference from expectations. The result that
the constant-rate policy best stabilizes the economy
is at sharp odds with most analysts’ and policymakers’
expectations. Most believe stabilizing real GDP
growth and inflation would require significant vola-
tility in the interest rate (for example, Hall and
Mankiw). Accordingly, most would expect the con-
stant interest rate version of the lagged adjustment
rule to fail at stabilizing the economy.
The expected failure of the constant-rate policy
rule is supported by economic theory.
25 Theory sug-
gests pegging an interest rate will reduce policymak-
ers’ control of inflation and tend to lead to excessive
inflation. When monetary policy pegs an interest
rate, it must accommodate every increase in the
demand for money. An increase in money demand
will tend to push up the interest rate, so monetary
policy must increase the supply of money to keep
the interest rate at the pegged level. Because in-
creases in the supply of money lead to increases in
the price level, there is nothing to tie down the price
level (Friedman; Blanchard and Fischer). Interest
rate pegging therefore reduces policymakers’ con-
trol of inflation.
CONCLUSIONS
Some analysts argue monetary policy should
follow a simple nominal GDP targeting rule. They
point to the general benefits of targets and to the
specific advantages of nominal GDP targets and
rules for policy. A number of alternative nominal
GDP targeting rules have been proposed. These rules
include adjusting an interest rate so that forecasted
nominal GDP growth always equals the targeted
rate, and adjusting a current interest rate in response
to last quarter’s gap between actual and targeted
nominal GDP growth.
Simulations of models of the economy with
nominal GDP targeting rules yield two troubling
findings. First, some pieces of the simulation evi-
dence contradict the results of earlier studies which
used slightly different models. Second, some pieces
of the simulation evidence differ sharply with most
analysts’ and policymakers’ prior expectations about
successful policies. These findings show that, based
on simulation analysis, policymakers cannot be cer-
tain a simple nominal GDP targeting rule will im-
prove economic performance.
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This appendix details the specifications of
the atheoretical and structural models, the speci-
fication of the forecast adjustment rule, and the
simulation procedure.
The atheoretical model
The atheoretical model takes the form of a
vector autoregression (VAR), augmented to in-
clude an error correction term. The VAR vari-
ables consist of real GDP growth, inflation as
measured by the growth rate of the GDP implicit
price deflator, M2 growth, and the 3-month T-
bill rate. The error correction term equals the log
level of M2 velocity. Four lags of each variable
are included in the VAR. The residuals of each
VAR equation represent the model shocks.
While this model imposes few restrictions
on the data, it lacks a theoretical structure. None
of the model’s equations or disturbance terms
can be directly interpreted as aggregate supply
or aggregate demand forms. The only structure
imposed on the model is the assumption that the
interest rate equation of the VAR represents
historical policy (following Feldstein and
Stock). Monetary policy may be viewed as set-
ting the interest rate according to a rule given by
the deterministic component of the equation,
with discretionary changes in policy given by the
residual.
The structural model
The structural model takes a textbook
aggregate supply/aggregate demand form, with
equations for aggregate demand, aggregate sup-
ply, and historical monetary policy.
26 The aggre-
gate demand function relates current real GDP
growth to lagged values of growth, lagged values
of the real short-term interest rate, and a demand
disturbance:
DYt = a0 + a1 DYt-1 + a2 DYt-2
+ a3 (it-2 - p t
e
-2) + a4 (it-4 - pt
e
-4)




where DY denotes real GDP growth, i represents
the 3-month T-bill rate, pe denotes the expected
rate of inflation, and e
d is a demand shock.
Expected inflation equals the inflation rate pre-
dicted by a relationship between actual inflation
and lagged values of inflation and the interest rate:
pt
e = d0 + å 
j=1
4




The aggregate supply function relates actual
inflation to expected inflation, the gap between
the levels of actual and potential real GDP, and
a supply disturbance:
pt = pt
e + .02 (Yt - YPt) + et
s ,
where Y and YP indicate the levels of, respec-
tively, actual and potential real GDP, and es is a
supply shock. Potential output is measured as
the smooth trend in actual real GDP.27 The Phil-
lips curve slope is set at 0.02 to be consistent
20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYwith previous studies (such as Judd and Motley
1992, 1993).
The historical policy equation relates the
current interest rate to lagged values of the in-
terest rate, real GDP growth, inflation, and a
discretionary disturbance:




bj+2it-j + å 
j=1
3
bj+6 pt-j + et
pol ,
where epol is a discretionary change in monetary
policy. Monetary policy may be viewed as set-
ting the interest rate according to a rule given
by the deterministic component of the equation,
with discretionary changes in policy given by
the residual epol.
The model parameters
The parameters of the atheoretical and
structural models are estimated using quarterly
data from 1959 to 1988. Ending the sample
period in 1988 is a matter of convenience: 1959-
88 parameter estimates produce more stable
simulations than 1959-93 estimates. The insta-
bility induced by extending the sample period
may be associated with the recent upward trend
in M2 velocity.
Specification of the forecast 
adjustment rule
The forecast rule is based upon a simple
regression relationship between the interest rate
and nominal GDP growth, fit with 1959-88 data:
DXt = j0 + j1DXt-1 + j2DXt-2
+ j3it-2 + j4it-3 + j5it-4 + et ,
where DX denotes nominal GDP growth and
e represents the error in forecasting current
nominal GDP growth from previous values of
nominal GDP growth and the interest rate. Ac-
cording to this relationship, movements in the
current interest rate do not affect growth until
two quarters in the future. So the forecast rule
adjusts the current interest rate to keep nominal
growth two quarters hence on target.
The adjustment rule simplifies to a relation-
ship between the current interest rate and lagged
values of the interest rate and nominal GDP
growth. The rule specification assumes the Fed-
eral Reserve has only lagged information on
growth and inflation when it must decide to
adjust the current interest rate. The parameters
of the rule are derived by using the estimated
nominal GDP growth equation to compute the
forecasted growth rate two periods in the future
as a function of the current interest rate and the
lagged interest rates and growth rates, setting
that forecast equal to the target growth rate, and
then solving for the current interest rate.
Simulation procedure
The basic simulation procedure consists of
two steps, the second of which is performed
twice. The first step is to generate random
shocks for 1989-98 from the same statistical
distribution as the actual shocks observed for the
selected model.
28 The second step is to pass the
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1 Because of difficulties in measuring the aggregate price
level, price stability does not necessarily correspond to a 0
percent rate of inflation in measures of the aggregate price
level (Kahn).  Price stability is achieved when inflation is
sufficiently low and stable that it is not a factor in the
decisions made by households and firms.
2 Tobin, an early advocate of nominal GDP targeting, pointed
out the short-run relationship between nominal GDP growth
and real GDP growth in 1980.
3 In this example, nominal GDP growth differs slightly from
the sum of real GDP growth and inflation because of rounding
error in the data.
4 This simple discussion abstracts from concerns which some
analysts raise in detailed analyses. While under one mathematical
model of the economy nominal GDP would be a better target
than the monetary aggregates, under another reasonable
model the aggregates would be superior (Bean; West).
5  A simple model of aggregate supply and aggregate demand
shows that the precise amount by which real GDP falls and
inflation rises depends on the slope of the aggregate supply
curve.
6 In response to supporters of discretionary policy, some
advocates of rules stress that the procedures they propose and
study need not be used as strict rules.  These rule proponents
point out that the policy decisions dictated by a rule might
simply be used as a baseline path around which discretionary
policy decisions could be oriented (Judd and Motley 1992,
1993; McCallum 1993; Taylor).  Under this strategy a rule
would probably affect policy decisions, but permit
discretionary policy changes.
7 More formally, the inflationary bias in discretionary policy
stems from a problem known as time inconsistency (Kydland
and Prescott; Barro and Gordon).  The simple discussion here
abstracts from the important role that expectations of future
events, such as policy adjustments, play in the problem of
time inconsistency.
8 Some analysts argue for rules that adjust another instrument
of monetary policy, the monetary base, to keep nominal GDP
on target (McCallum 1987, 1988).  Interest rate-based rules
offer the advantage that they involve little change from the
Fed’s current policy-setting practices.  Currently, when
policymakers wish to change the stance of monetary policy,
they typically do so by adjusting short-term nominal interest
rates.
9 Hall and Mankiw (1993) suggest a closely related type of
rule, under which policymakers would adjust the interest rate
in response to not only the gap between actual and targeted
nominal GDP growth but also to the gap between actual and
simulated shocks through the selected model
to create artificial data on real GDP growth,
inflation, and the interest rate for 1989-98. Fol-
lowing Feldstein and Stock (1993), on one pass
of this step the historical policy equation is
used as the policy rule to construct artificial
historical data. On the other pass one of the
policy rules is imposed in lieu of the historical
policy equation, to construct the counterfactual
data which would be observed if the rule were
imposed.
29
The ten years of artificial data are then used
to compare the volatility of the economy under
the policy rule to volatility under historical pol-
icy. To gauge the average effects of the policy
change, this comparison is made for each of
1,000 simulated 1989-98 data sets (again, fol-
lowing Feldstein and Stock). Tables 1 and 2
report the median (over the 1,000 data sets)
percentage changes—from historical policy to
the rule—in the standard deviations of growth
and inflation.
22 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYpotential real GDP levels.  Such a hybrid procedure offers the
advantage that if nominal GDP growth exceeds target but the
real GDP level falls below potential, policymakers would
adjust policy less aggressively than they would under the
simpler growth rules.  When simulated using the models and
procedures of this article, hybrid rules fail, raising volatility
in both real GDP growth and inflation above historical levels.
This finding conflicts with the results of Hall and Mankiw
(1993).
10 This rule takes the mathematical form 
Dit = x (DGDPt-1 - DGDP *) ,
where Dit indicates the change in the interest rate, DGDPt-1
denotes last period’s nominal GDP growth rate (annualized),
and DGDP * equals the target growth rate.
11 For a one-percentage-point gap between actual and
targeted GDP growth on a quarterly basis, which corresponds
to a four-percentage-point gap on an annual basis,
policymakers adjust the interest rate 50 basis points.  Since
Judd and Motley (1992) specified the policy rule in terms of
GDP growth on a quarterly basis, they set the adjustment rate
to 0.50.  Since this article (following Judd and Motley 1993)
specifies the rule in terms of GDP growth on an annual basis,
it sets the corresponding adjustment parameter x at 0.125.
12 Delays in the reporting of nominal GDP may result in
additional, but much smaller, disadvantages to the lagged
adjustment rule.  The U.S. Commerce Department typically
provides a preliminary estimate of a quarter’s nominal GDP
three to four weeks after the end of the quarter.  Under the
lagged adjustment rule, this reporting delay would add
roughly another month to the two to three quarters which
would pass before a change in monetary policy would be
made in response to a deviation of nominal GDP from target.
Moreover, because the preliminary estimate of nominal GDP
is typically revised later, measurement error may create
unnecessary volatility in the economy.  If, for example,
nominal GDP growth proves to be at the target rate but the
preliminary estimate was above target, changing monetary
policy in response to the preliminary estimate would create
unnecessary volatility.  In simulation analysis, however, the
additional volatility created by data revisions appears to be
small (Judd and Motley 1993).
13 This rule has no simple mathematical form.  Based upon
the model used to forecast nominal GDP growth, the rule
relates the current interest rate to values of a variety of
variables, such as past interest rates and past inflation, which
are used to forecast future nominal GDP growth.  The
appendix explains the precise form of the forecast adjustment
rule used in this article.
14 The Federal Reserve presents projections for nominal GDP
growth in its semiannual report to Congress on the Full
Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978.  Projections
made by the Federal Open Market Committee for 1993 and
1994, for example, are published in 1993 Monetary Policy
Objectives: Midyear Review.
15 Hall and Mankiw (1993) prefer this specification of the
forecast rule because it eliminates the possibility of
policymakers’ discretion affecting monetary policy and
therefore eliminates the possibility of an inflationary bias in
policy.  If the rule were to use Federal Reserve forecasts,
policy actions might be affected by the judgments of
policymakers naturally embedded in the forecast.  Policymakers’
discretion might enter, for example, in predicting the effects of
a change in monetary policy during a time of unprecedented
financial innovation.  The forecasting model projects the
effects of the policy change from existing economic theory
and historical economic fluctuations; the forecasters, who in
this case would be policymakers, would adjust the model
projection based on their judgment of the effects of the
ongoing innovation.
16 For each of the rules, the target nominal GDP growth rate
equals the historical average growth rate. This article
abstracts from the possibility that a rule would improve upon
historical policy by preventing the Federal Reserve from
systematically exceeding a targeted rate of growth.  This
analysis simply presumes the historical average nominal GDP
growth rate to represent the historical target rate. To the extent
that historical policy actually overshot its underlying target,
this analysis will understate any benefits associated with a
policy rule which ensures average growth near the target.
17 Following Feldstein and Stock (1993), historical volatility
is measured from estimates of how the economy would
respond to the artificial disturbances if policymakers adjusted
the interest rate as they appear to have adjusted it historically.
As detailed in the appendix, historical policy is represented
by the estimated historical relationship between the interest
rate and other variables such as inflation. This historical
policy for adjusting the interest rate is combined with a model
of the economy and used to generate artificial data on real
GDP growth, inflation, and the interest rate.  These generated
data measure how the economy would respond to the same
artificial disturbances affecting the rule-guided economy if
policy were directed as it has been historically. Volatility
under the policy rules is compared to volatility in these
counterfactual, historical policy-guided data.
18 The levels specification reflects the presumption that, over
the 1959-88 period, the short-term nominal interest rate is
stationary, consistent with the stationarity of velocity
reported, for example, by Hallman, Porter, and Small (1991).
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1994 2319 As in Mankiw (1992), for example, the model features an
aggregate supply function which is positively sloped in the
short run and vertical in the long run and an aggregate demand
function which is importantly affected by monetary policy.
20 In a textbook IS/LM model of aggregate demand, the
aggregate demand function specified in this article’s structural
model corresponds to the IS curve.  This specification assumes
that monetary policy allows the money supply to adjust in
keeping the interest rate at a desired level.   Other studies
(such as Judd and Motley 1992, 1993) specify an aggregate
demand function which corresponds to a combination of the
IS and LM curves, with the restriction that changes in
expected inflation have no impact on aggregate demand.
21 The policy rule simulations set the interest rate constant at
the average level produced by the historical policy
simulations.
22 These statements apply to their “conservative assumptions”
results, in which the shocks to aggregate demand are the
same as those observed historically despite the change in
policy-setting procedures.  The rule performs much better
under their alternative, highly optimistic assumption that
the forecast adjustment rule eliminates all shocks to
aggregate demand and deviations of nominal GDP growth
from target.
23 The tables of results reported by Hall and Mankiw (1993)
show that the rule significantly raises inflation volatility
above the historical level when, as in this analysis, volatility
is measured by the standard deviation of inflation (the
variability of inflation about the historical mean rate of
inflation).  In their discussion of the results, however, Hall
and Mankiw concluded that the rule reduces inflation
volatility below the historical level.  That statement is only
true when the historical volatility of inflation is measured by
the root-mean-squared deviation of inflation, which is the
variation of inflation about zero.  The comparison made by
Hall and Mankiw gives an unfair advantage to the rule, which
they designed to achieve average inflation of zero, unless it
is assumed that policymakers’ historical inflation goal was
very different from the historical average inflation rate.
24 Simulations of a structural model patterned after that of
Judd and Motley (1992, 1993) yield results qualitatively
similar to theirs. The lagged adjustment rule significantly
reduces inflation volatility with little effect on real GDP
growth volatility. Using their structural model, when the
adjustment parameter x is set at 0.20, the lagged adjustment
rule reduces inflation volatility by about 7 percent while
raising real GDP growth volatility about 1.5 percent. When x
is set at 0.125, the rule reduces inflation volatility by about 4
percent while having no effect on real GDP growth volatility.
25 While pegging an interest rate is widely viewed as an
inferior policy, under some circumstances pegging an interest
rate can be a superior policy.  In an economy that has stable
money demand but is subject to disturbances in the textbook
“IS” curve, pegging an interest rate stabilizes the economy
(Poole).
26 The precise form of the aggregate demand function was
derived by eliminating statistically insignificant variables in
a more general regression of real GDP growth on lags of
growth and lags of the real interest rate.  The inflation
expectations equation was derived by eliminating statistically
insignificant lags in various regressions of inflation on lagged
values of inflation and other variables such as growth, the
interest rate, and the output gap.  The policy equation
specification was obtained by eliminating statistically
insignificant lags in different regressions of the interest rate
on lagged values of the interest rate and other variables.
27 The trend is estimated with the Hodrick and Prescott
(1980) filter.
28 Overall results differ very little when the models are
instead simulated over 1960-98, using a variety of initial
conditions.  The artificial shocks are drawn from a normal
distribution with the variance-covariance matrix equal to that
of the historical estimates of the model shocks.
29 On the pass used to construct historical data, simulated
interest rate equation shocks are included in the model.  These
shocks represent artificial discretionary policy changes like
those observed historically (as measured by the residual in
the estimated historical policy equation).  Consequently, the
precise specification of historical policy is not crucial to the
results.  Estimating a model which includes an interest rate
equation from historical data and then using it to create
artificial data from randomly generated disturbances having
the same distribution as the estimated model disturbances will
yield artificial data with the same volatility as the actual,
historical data.  This applies regardless of the precise form of
the historical interest rate equation.
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